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Licencia Creative Commons Atribución 4.0 Internacional (CC BY 4.0)
Revista Cátedra, 9(2), pp. 49-62, July-December 2026. e-ISSN: 2631-2875
https://doi.org/10.29166/catedra.v9i2.9947
1.2 The narco-state: criminal penetration and institutional weakness
The concept of a narco-state, while controversial in political science and public debate, is
operationally useful for describing the process of partial capture of state institutions by
criminal organizations. In the Ecuadorian context, Masson-Fiallos accurately describes how
drug trafficking operates as an ecosystem with a high capacity for adaptation, branching
out, and co-opting officials at various levels of public administration: from judicial and
police officers to local authorities and legislators (Masson-Fiallos, 2024). This infiltration
occurs not only through mechanisms of direct economic corruption but also through the use
of armed violence as an instrument of institutional coercion, which is critically reflected in
the presence of recruiters of minors for organized crime groups both inside and outside of
school environments.
Several authors, from a historical and comparative perspective that articulates the
experiences of Mexico and Ecuador, analyze how neoliberal economic dynamics and drug
trafficking have converged to produce profound transformations in Latin American
organized crime (Maldonado-Aranda and Vera-Cabrera, 2025). In their analysis published
in the journal Iuris, they argue that the criminal crisis in Ecuador is linked to state
restructuring processes that weakened the regulatory capacities of the public sector,
reduced social investment, and worsened the living conditions of large segments of the
population. These variables created the objective conditions for the expansion of organized
crime, transforming it into a breeding ground that exploits the lack of development
opportunities to recruit young people into organized crime groups. Similarly, Barrionuevo-
Santamaría et al. identify institutional weakness as one of the determining factors in the
cycle of violence. This fragility manifests itself in the erosion of public trust in institutions,
the collapse of the prison system, and the widespread perception of impunity (Barrionuevo-
Santamaría et al., 2024). The National Assembly of Ecuador, in its investigation of the prison
crisis, documented how the various branches of government failed to prevent and resolve
the security emergency, revealing an institutional paralysis of historic proportions
(National Assembly of Ecuador, 2021, 223).
1.3 Codes of coexistence: a regulatory framework in the face of the crisis
Codes of conduct were conceived in the Ecuadorian education system as participatory
instruments designed to regulate interpersonal relationships within the school community,
promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and guarantee a violence-free learning
environment. Their legal basis lies in the General Regulations to the Organic Law of
Intercultural Education, which mandates their design, implementation, and evaluation in all
institutions nationwide. In theory, these instruments should be developed democratically
with the educational community and reviewed periodically to address specific local
contexts.
However, an examination of contemporary reality reveals a structural gap between the
purely normative design of codes of conduct and the scale of violence facing the country.
These instruments were designed to address low-intensity conflicts inherent in ordinary
school dynamics: bullying, indiscipline, peer tensions, or non-compliance with rules that
affect the right to education. Its original conceptual architecture does not consider scenarios