Reflections on the intersections between neuroscience and criminal culpability
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29166/dpc.v3i3.3340Keywords:
Neurolaw, Neuroscience, Criminal culpability, Free will, NeurotechnologiesAbstract
In this article, the author reflects on the possible contributions of the most recent neuroscientific studies, in relation to the study and analysis of the theory of crime, especially the analytical category of criminal culpability. To this end, among other things, the jurist analyses the main conceptions sustained in the field of neurosciences, the most outstanding methodological problems that arise from uncritically transferring neuroscientific contributions to the subject área of criminal law and the fallibility of experiments based on current “neurotechnologies”. To conclude, Arocena proposes a provisional and brief conclusion, although no less disturbing.
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