Movimientos estratégicos y proceso constituyente en el Ecuador

el momento de la des-institucionalización

Abstract

The article examines how Ecuador’s 2007 Constituent Assembly emerged from a long-standing public demand for political reform amid chronic institutional crisis. Julio Echeverría argues that President Rafael Correa’s government adopted a maximalist strategy consisting of two phases: first, de-institutionalization, marked by the disregard of constitutional procedures, confrontation with traditional political parties, and the removal of bodies such as the Constitutional Court; and second, institutional reconfiguration through a plenipotentiary Constituent Assembly. Although the referendum showed broad public support, this process introduces democratic risks by weakening the rule of law, fostering a plebiscitary logic, and expanding political discretion in ways that threaten pluralism, deliberation, and constitutional guarantees. Echeverría warns that while the desire for change is clear, the lack of defined direction may lead to power concentration and erosion of rights.